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COMMENTS
EVIDENCE OR INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING
TAXES IN PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS
T HE amount recovered by a plaintiff in a personal injury action
is expressly exempted from the federal income tax by the
Internal Revenue Code.' A portion of the recovery in such an
action is based on impairment of the plaintiff's earning capacity
As is commonly known, money received from the exercise of one's
earning capacity is subject to the federal income tax.' Thus, the
question quite naturally presents itself: should income tax liability
be a factor in determining the amount of damages to be awarded
a plaintiff in a personal injury action?
Recently this question was squarely presented in Texas & New
Orleans R.R. v. Pool,4 a personal injury action arising under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.' In attempted mitigation of
damages defendant railroad had sought to introduce evidence of
the federal income taxes that would have been withheld from the
plaintiff's gross wages from future employment had he not been
disabled. The trial court refused to permit introduction of the
evidence. On appeal this holding was affirmed by the Court of
Civil Appeals for the Tenth Supreme Judicial District (Waco) .
1 INT. REV. CODE § 22 (b) (5).
2 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1949) §924.
3 INT. REV. CODE § 22 (a).
4 Tex. Civ. App., 10th Dist. (Waco), Nov. 19, 1953. Not yet reported.
535 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. 1946 ed. § 51.
6 The court stated in part as follows:
"The 9th circuit court in Southern Pacific Railway Co. vs. Guthrie [cited
note 16 infra] . . . in discussing the question here presented, said: 'We think
the court's view that the net take home pay, after taxes, would represent the
actual loss, is correct; but we are now convinced that we cannot tell how much
this would be. Under the tax law then in force, he could look forward to an
additional exemption after age 65, and because he was married, the split income
features of the law would give two additional exemptions when he reached 65,
something about which we cannot tell.'
"Our view is that the rule announced in Southern Pacific vs. Guthrie, supra,
is perhaps the one that should be followed .... The Supreme Court of Missouri,
in a well considered opinion in Dempsey vs. Thompson, 251 S.W. 2d 42, followed
the rule announced by the 9th circuit in Southern Pacific Railway Co. vs.
Guthrie, supra. It further held in effect that the defendant (on request) would
be entitled to an instruction that any amount awarded plaintiff would not be
subject to Federal Income Tax. We are in accord with that view."
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The court in this respect followed what is the prevailing rule both
in this country and in England.' The court in effect conceded that
the result of permitting a verdict based on the present value of the
gross wages that might have been received absent the disabling
injury is to permit the plaintiff to recover for more than his "actual
loss,"8 and that such a result is not consistent with the basic prin-
ciple that damages should be compensatory.9 The justification for
such a course, the court indicated, is that the impact of future
income taxes upon the gross wages is simply too speculative an
element to be considered in determining the plaintiff's "actual loss."
The court's holding on this point seems reasonably clear. By way
of dictum, however, the court added that the defendant would be
entitled, upon request, to an instruction that any amount awarded
to the plaintiff would not be subject to the federal income tax."
Is the dictum consistent with the holding?
Let it be assumed that the present worth of the gross wages that
the plaintiff would have earned is $50,000. The defendant has
tried to show that because of probable income taxes the net loss
or actual loss to the plaintiff is in the vicinity of, say, $40,000.
This the defendant has not been permitted to do. If the jury, which
has been strenuously urged to return a verdict which is compen-
satory," is also told that the verdict will not be taxable, is it not
possible that the jurors will make an effort to arrive at some net
figure through a rough, uninformed estimate as to the impact of
income taxes upon the gross wages? And would this not frustrate
the basic objective that the jury shall not take taxes into account
in determining the damages? Commentators have noted the seem-
ing inconsistency involved in such proc6dure. 2
7 See cases cited notes 15 and 16 infra.
s See note 6 supra.
4 RESTATEMENT, TouRs (1949) § 924.
10 See note 6 supra.
11 Cf. Reavio v. Taylor, 162 S. W. 2d 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) er. ref. n.r.e.
12 Comments, 33 B. U. L. Rev. 114 (1953) ; 32 Neb. L. Rev. 491 (1953) ; 32 Tex.
L. Rev. 108 (1953).
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It is not clear, however, that the trial judge can exclude taxation
from the consideration of the jury by the simple process of for-
bidding all mention of it at the trial. If nothing whatever is said
to the jury about taxation, it is not inconceivable that the jurors
may receive from one of their number an argument running
somewhat like this: "We've been told to compensate the plaintiff
by finding the present value of the wages he is going to lose.
We've agreed that this amount is $50,000. But what's going to
happen if we give this fellow a lump sum like that? The Goverin-
ment will take at least half. And what will be compensatory about
that? I don't know what tax rates are, but it's pretty obvious that
if we want this fellow to get $50,000, we'll have to return a verdict
for $100,000 or maybe $150,000. The railroad can pay it, and
as far as I'm concerned they ought to pay it." Is this an unlikely
scene? Defendants' counsel do not think so, and have tried to
avoid it by placing before the jury the basic legal fact that the
verdict will not be taxed. 8 Such a case was Hall v. Chicago &
N.W. R.R.," where it was held that the defendant's lawyer, in
an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, was not out
of order in telling the jury, in the course of his summation, that
the verdict, if any, would not be subject to income tax. The court's
justification for this holding was a purported desire to prevent a
ballooning of the verdict through an erroneous supposition on the
part of the jury that the lump sum awarded to the plaintiff would
be heavily taxed. Apparently the court did not take account of the
fact that a jury so advised might reduce the verdict in order to
arrive at what it conceived to be truly compensatory damages. If
taxes are effectively to be removed from the consideration of the
jury in personal injury cases, it appears that these two aspects of
the problem must be recognized and dealt with.
"s See Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N.E. 2d 654 (1953); Demp-
sey v. Thompson, 251 S.W. 2d 42 (Mo. 1952); Hilton v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 177, 227
S.W. 2d 675 (1950).
14 Cited in note 13.
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As previously noted, it is the prevailing rule, both in England"5
and this country," that in a personal injury action the taxability
of future wages should not be considered by the jury. In this
country there have been some expressions and dicta to the con-
trary," including language in an early civil appeals case in
15 Billingham v. Hughes, [1949] 1 K.B. 643 (C.A.), 9 A.L.R. 2d 311 (1949);
Blackwood v. Andre, 1947 S.C. 333 (Scot.) ; Fine v. Toronto Transp. Comm., [19461 1
D.L.R. 221 (Ont.) But cf. M'Daid v. Clyde Navigation Trustees, 1946 S.C. 462 (Scot.)
1 Southern Pacific v. Guthrie, 186 F. 2d 926 (9th Cir. 19,1) ; Chicago & N.W. Ry.
,Co. v. Curl, 178 F. 2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Stokes v. U. S.., 144 F. 2d 497 (2d Cir.
1944) ; Dempsey v. Thompson, cited note 13 supra; Smith v. Penn. R.R., 99 N.E. 2d
.501 (Ohio App. 1950) ; Tex. & New Orleans Ry. v. Pool, cited note 4 supra.
17 In Phillips v. Phillips, 219 S.W. 2d 249 (Mo. App. 1949), it was held that the
trial court was justified in considering the effect which tax liability would have on an
•alimony award to the wife in fixing the amount thereof. This case seems distinguish.
able on the ground, among others, that the possibility of periodic adjustments in the
amount of alimony to be paid renderb a consideration of the effect of taxation on the
.award much less conjectural than is the same consideration in a case where the
award, once granted, is final.
Sunray Oil Co. v. Allbritton, 188 F. 2d 751 (5th Cir. 1953), and Wetherbee v.
Elgin, Joliet, and Eastern R.R., 191 F. 2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951), dealt with situations
wherein the defendant was urging, on appeal, that damages awarded in the trial court
were excessive. The court in the Wetherbee case, after holding that the award was
excessive and that the jury's action in rendering the verdict was capricious and arbi-
trary, noted that the award was excessively generous inasmuch as it was based on
gross rather than net earnings which the plaintiff would have received but for the
injury. Similar language, in a similar factual context, may be found in the dissenting
.opinion in the Stnray Oil Co. case, 188 F. 2d at 754, and in De Vito v. United States
Airlines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
Avance v. Thompson, 320 Ill. App. 406, 51 N.E. 2d 334 (1943), and Cole v.
Chicago, St. P., M., & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443 (D. Minn. 1945), also involved situa-
tions where one party was urging that the damages awarded the other were excessive.
In the course of the opinion in the Avance case, the court stated, "As a court of
appeals . . . we can neither speculate or conjecture as to how plaintiff's financial status
might be affected by business booms or depressions; . . . or how his earnings might
be affected by his expenses away from home, taxes, work clothing, union dues, social
security and old age pension. We assume that the jury took these matters into consid.
eration in arriving at their verdict ... " 51 N.E. 2d at 341. (Emphasis supplied.) This
language was quoted by the court in Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. In neither
case, however, was the question of tax liability of the award really in issue. The
language emphasized, supra, was seemingly loose dictum incident to the court's primary
holding that the damages were not excessive. Further, if the matters enumerated by
the court are, as was stated, too conjectural for the court to consider, one would sup-
-pose them to be too conjectural for jury consideration also.
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Texas,"8 but most courts which have squarely considered the prob-
lem in recent years have concluded, as did the court in Texas &
New Orleans R.R. v. Pool, that the impact of future taxes is too
speculative a matter to be submitted to the jury. 9 In England the
same result has been reached apparently on the theory that the
benefit of the exemption from tax of the personal injury verdict
should accrue to the victim and not to the tortfeasor.0 These cases
have typically dealt with the problem whether the defendant may
adduce evidence concerning the probable impact of taxes upon
future wages, and have held that he may not.
As has also been noted, complete silence on the issue of taxes
is no assurance that the issue will effectively be removed from the
consideration of the jury. And this problem seems rarely to have
been dealt with in the appellate courts. Prior to the recent dictum
in the Pool case the problem was apparently considered only by
the Illinois2 and the Missouri courts.22 The outcome in Illinois
was the Hall case, with the unfortunate result noted. In Missouri,
however, the supreme court has suggested that in personal injury
actions the jury should be instructed "substantially" as follows:28
You are instructed that any award made to plaintiff as damages in this
18 In Galveston, Harrisburg, & S.A. Ry. v. Dehnisch, 57 S.W. 64, 65 (Tex. Civ. App.
1900), an instruction to the jury that damages for diminished capacity to earn money
and the calculation of the present worth of the future earnings so lost were to be
calculated upon the basis of a return of six per cent per annum was held to be erroneous
because "it is judicially known that some of this 6% must go for taxes and expenses
of investment, to say nothing of the vicissitudes attending the loan of money." The
court thus seemed to suggest that account should be taken of taxes with a view to
making the verdict more compensatory. This case dealt with a contract which extended
over a relatively short period of time as compared to the life expectancy of a given
individual, and for this reason alone the effect of contemporaneous taxes was pre-
sumably less conjectural. It is interesting to note that this case was not discussed by
the court in the recent Pool case.
19 Cases cited note 16 supra.
20 The same view was expressed in the Pool case by Chief Justice Frank 0. Mc-
Donald, who concurred with the majority on the tax point but dissented on other
grounds.
21 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., cited note 13 supra.
22 Dempsey v. Thompson, Hilton v. Thompson, both cited note 13 supra.
23 Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W. 2d at 45. Emphasis added.
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case, if any award is made, is not subject to Federal or State income
taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of
any award made plaintiff, if any you make.
Such an instruction, said the Missouri Supreme Court, "would
at once and for all purposes take the subject of income taxes out
of the case." '24 And so it would, if the italicized portion of the
instruction were properly understood by the jury, for it should
prevent the jury from making unwarranted increases or decreases
in the verdict. It is not clear, however, that such language, standing
alone, would be understood by a jury. 5 Indeed, it does not appear
that this language was properly understood by the Illinois court
in the Hall case, for that court, while purporting to follow the
Missouri case, believed that taxes would be completely removed
from the consideration of the jury if defendant's counsel was
permitted to tell the jury simply that the verdict would be tax-
free.
It is submitted that the desired objective of eliminating the
tax issue "at once and for all purposes" would best be achieved
by a more explicit instruction-possibly one substantially as fol-
lows: (1) The jury is to find the present worth of the gross wages
that the plaintiff would have earned but for the disabling injury.
(2) The jury is not to deduct from the amount so found any sums
which it is thought the plaintiff would have to pay in taxes if he
actually earned such gross wages. (3) The jury is not to add to
the amount so found any sum to compensate for supposed reduc-
tion of the verdict by taxation. And it would be helpful if, in
concluding such an instruction, the trial judge would emphasize
generally that the tax aspects of the case are fully taken care of
by the income tax laws and that the jurors are not to take any
account whatever of income taxes in arriving at the estimated
damages.
241 d. at 45.
25 Cl. Comments, 33 B. U. L. Rev. 114 (1953); 32 Neb. L. Rev. 491 (1953); 32
Tex. L. Rev. 108 (1953).
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There is no reason to suppose that this suggestion is in any way
inconsistent with the general language in the Pool opinion. The
court of civil appeals, while not quoting the all-important caveat
in the opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court, indicated that it
adhered to the views of the Missouri court. 26 The views of the
Missouri court are basically sound; the only point made here is
that the instruction to the jury should be sufficiently explicit to
avoid any possibility of confusion on the tax issue.
less Thomas Hay.
26 See note 6 supra.
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